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The purpose of this paper is twofold: to
introduce the role of money and credit in
Chinato those unfamiliar with the subject, and
to propose some fundamental re-thinking in
the conduct of Chinese monetary and credit
policy.
China today is in a period oftransition. Dis-
satisfied with the economy's past perfor-
mance, the authorities in recent years have
instituted a series of reform measures
designed to infuse more material incentives
and a greater use of market principles in an
otherwise rigidly controlled economy. The
essence of the reform lies in giving farmers
and enterprises greater autonomy in produc-
tion and investment decisions in response to
market forces.
The future ofthe reform is now threatened
by inflation. To combat inflation, the govern-
ment has ordered draconian cutbacks in
investment projects, thus in effect suspending
the recently instituted production and invest-
ment autonomy. This creates a policy
dilemma: over the years, tight controls have
strangled work incentives and caused serious
waste and inefficiency; yet, under the present
institutional set-up, direct administrative con-
trois appear to be indispensable for combating
inflation. In the short run, the government has
decided to fight inflation now and ease controls
later. But, in the long run, do the authorities
have adequate policy instruments for fighting
inflation without direct controls? The answer
to this question will determine whether future
spending decisions will be made by the market
according to the spirit ofthe reform or by the
central-planning authorities as under the old
regime.
Inflation is in essence a monetary
phenomenon. In the long run, China's ability
to "modernize" its economy without
aggravating inflationary pressures will to a
large extent depend on whether China can
forge an effective monetary policy that does
not rely primarily on direct controls.
Section I presents an overview ofmoney and
banking in China. The rest ofthe paper raises a
number of policy issues, specifically (0 the
usefulness of the quantity equation of money
and the measurementofmoney in the Chinese
context, (in Section II), and (2) the principles
of credit policy followed in China (in Section
UI). The findings and conclusions are sum-
marized in Section IV.
I. Money and Banking in China
To assess the role of money and banking in
Chinait is essential first to understand how the
Chinese economy functions, as, not
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surprisingly, China under socialism operates
along vastly different lines from economies
under capitalism. In this section, we describe
the structure ofthe Chinese economy, the use
ofeconomic planning (and especially financial
planning) to allocate the nation's resources,
and then some fundamentals of the banking
and monetary system. Our sketch of the real
side of the economy will be brief, limited to
what is necessary to help explain the function-
ing of the financial system. I And because
institutions and policies are changing rapidly,we do not try to incorporate all the recent
changes into this briefoverview. The emphasis
here is rather on the fundamentals ofChina's
monetary and banking system, which remain
largely intact in spite of recent modifications.
Economic Structure and Planning
The People's Republic of China was
founded in 1949, but it took the authorities
about seven years to communize what had
been a largely private-enterprise economy.
Prior to 1949, nearly all the means ofproduc-
tion had been privately owned, aside from
state-owned infrastructure facilities such as
harbors, railroads, schools, hospitals, and pub-
lic utilities. After 1949, by stages, all the
farms, mines, factories, shops, and banks
became either state-owned enterprises (i.e.,
belonging to "all people") or collectives (i.e.,
owned collectively by members). Except for a
presumably small amount of interest income,
total household income today consists of
either state-paid wages and salaries or collec-
tive distributions offunds according to earned
work points and retained earnings.2 On the
farms, where eighty percent of the population
reside, the collective form predominates; in
industry and commerce, except handicrafts,
the state-ownership form is dominant. In
either case, everyone works directly or
indirectly for the state, and all economic
activities are, at least in theory, conducted in
accordance with state-designed economic
plans and under close state supervision.
China under communism has operated,
both in theory and in fact, as a planned econ-
omy, based on a series of five-year plans
stipulating medium-term national economic
goals. The State Planning Commission drafts
the five-year plans, and is also responsible for
drafting (a) an annual economic plan in terms
ofphysical input and output ofgoods and ser-
vices, and (b) a counterpart annual financial
plan in terms of money flows. The Commis-
sion works with proposed plans of individual
government and enterprise units, which are
consolidated and approved layer by layer up
the government structure. The State Planning
Commission, after final consolidation and
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reconciliation, submits the final plans to the
State Council (Cabinet) for approval. Once
approved, the plans become the blueprint of
the nation's economic activities during the
next year.
Price Stability and Inflation
Implicit in the physical and financial plans
are the prices of all the products included in
the plans. In principle, the authorities set all
prices, which cannot be changed thereafter
without explicit permission. Since the early
1950s, the authorities have attempted to main-
tain price stability for individual commodities
as well as in the aggregate.3 Indeed, for several
decades, government officials claimed that
China had been able to maintain prolonged
price stability in the midst ofa world racked by
unstable and rising inflation.4 They provided
no price indices in support, but most outside
scholars generally agreed with this claim. 5
However, price stability was purchased at
considerable cost. Government officials now
admit that the rigid price system, by favoring
heavy industries at the expense ofagriculture,
coal mining and consumer goods, has resulted
in serious production imbalances - with
perennial shortages offood, fuel, raw materials
and consumer goods co-existing with excess
inventories of a variety of unsold goods. 6
Waste and inefficiency are rampant. The
authorities are well aware ofthe problem, but
they also recognize that changing the price
system would mean a redistribution ofincome
among industries and regions, inevitably
benefitting some and hurting others. Few pru-
dent bureaucrats would want to open that Pan-
dora's box in a heavily politicized economic
system.
In a system where prices do not necessarily
reflect relative scarcity, it is not always possible
to distinguish between a condition ofrepressed
inflation and one of sectoral maladjustment.
Long queues may be indicative ofshortages of
only certain goods; even a general rise in con-
sumer prices may represent only a correction
ofa previous disparity between consumer and
producer-goods prices. Neither case provides
definitive evidence of the existence of infla-tionary pressures.
Yet, in spite ofthese conceptual difficulties,
China apparently experienced brief periods of
open inflation in 1953, 1956, 1960-61 and
again in 1979-81 7 In all these episodes,
widespread price increases followed unusually
rapid increases in currency circulation brought
forth by large unplanned government budget
deficits or credit expansions. The resultant
inflationary pressure manifested itself in two
forms: first, price increases for a wide range of
consumer goods, which were sold on a "free
market" that periodically operated alongside
the official market; and second, official price
increases, which helped to mop up excess cur-
rency issues through enhanced revenues ofthe
state trading agencies. 8
Financial Planning
The Chinese authorities have long main-
tained that inflation can arise only through
excess currency issue, which occurs only
through excess bank-credit extension for
financing business investments and govern-
ment budget deficits. (Banks do not extend
credit to consumers in China.) The authorities
attempt to regulate currency issues through
deliberate financial planning.9
The financial plan, as stated previously, is
the counterpart ofthe physical economic plan.
It is composed ofthe Government Budget, the
Credit Plan, and the Cash Plan. The Budget
needs no explanation. The Credit Plan sets out
the expected sources and uses of banking
funds. The Cash Plan specifies the planned
change in currency in circulation as a net result
of cash transactions between the government
sector (including enterprises) and households
(including the farm sector). The Ministry of
Finance is responsible for the Budget, and the
People's Bank ofChina for the Credit Plan and
the Cash Plan. All three plans are
simultaneously constrained by a national f1ow-
of-funds identity, so that increases in currency
in circulation must equal the increases in
banks' net lendings (i.e., net of increases in
deposits) to the government and enterprises,
minus increases in households' time and sav-
ings deposits. Thus, the banking system plays a
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key role in regulating currency in circulation,
and hence supporting the nation's financial
stability.
Banking System
The banking system in China today consists
of the People's Bank of China and three
special-purpose banks: the Bank of Agricul-
ture, the Construction Bank ofChina, and the
Bank of China. With more than 15,000
branches and offices and 330,000 staff mem-
bers at the end of1979, the People's Bank is at
once the nation's central bank and the only
bank providing a wide range of banking ser-
vices to the general public. lO In contrast, the
other three banks either perform special func-
tions or serve specific sectors: the Bank of
Agriculture serves the agricultural sector;
the Construction Bank finances plant-
equipment and infrastructure projects for
enterprises and government units; and the
Bank ofChina handles foreign-trade financing
and foreign-exchange administration. Within
the government structure, the President ofthe
People's Bank is a member ofthe State Coun-
cil with cabinet rank; the Bank of Agriculture
and the Bank of China, though reporting
directly to the State Council, come routinely
under the People's Bank supervision; while
the Construction Bank, although reporting to
the State Council, comes under Ministry of
Finance supervision.
(a) Financial supervision. As stated, each
year the banking system is responsible for
drafting a Credit Plan and a Cash Plan for sub-
mission to the State Planning Commission. In
addition, it is responsible for monitoring the
nation's financial flows to ensure that all is in
accordance to the plans. To facilitate surveil-
lance, all government units and enterprises
must set up accounts, called "transfer bal-
ances," in one or more of the four banks
according to the designated functional divi-
sions, and all payments among the entities
must be conducted through these bank
accounts. The entities may keep only a
minimal amount ofcash onhand, sufficient for
three days' operation in localities where there
is a banking office and up to 14 days wherethere is none. Only banks may extend credit,
since supplier's credits are prohibited, and
they must ensure that credits are extended
only as planned and used only for specified
purposes. Thus, the banking system serves as
the "controller" of the government and
enterprise sectors, exercising financial control
over all their economic activities.
In fact, however, banks must function
within the bureaucracy of which they are a
part. Deviations from plans can and do occur,
depending on the relative political clout ofthe
banks versus other entities within the power
structure. According to Vice Premier Yao Yi-
lin, in 1980 the financial plan called for the
banking system to issue 3.0 billion yuan in cur-
rency; the actual currency issue that year
amounted to 7.6 billion.lI That excess cur-
rency issue provides a good barometer of the
political pressure operating on the banking
system.
(b) Financial intermediation. In advanced
industrial countries, many types of financial
institutions - e.g., banks, savings institutions,
pension funds, insurance companies, mutual
funds - perform a financial intermediation
role by channeling household and business
savings into investments. In China, only the
banking system carries out that role. 12 By
prohibiting government agencies and
enterprises to hold more than a bare minimum
ofcash on hand, the law funnels all their finan-
cial surpluses through the banking system.
Households may hold their surplus funds in
any form, but their only real choice is between
currency and bank savings and time deposits.
Banks do not offer checking deposits. Sav-
ings and time deposits are available only to
households. Individuals may withdraw savings
deposits at any time without penalty, but must
pay an interest penalty when withdrawing time
deposits prior to maturity (ranging from six
months up to five years). Banks pay interest on
the transfer balances - restricted checking
accounts - held by enterprises, but not on
those held by government agencies.
China has built up a vast organization for
financial intermediation. This organization
includes 15,000 branches and offices of the
22
People's Bank in cities throughout the nation,
and more than 20,000 branches and offices of
the Agriculture Bank in smaller cities and
townships, in addition to 59,000 agricultural-
credit cooperatives scattered throughout rural
areas.
(c) Allocation ofcapital. China has adopted
the Soviet model of finance in distinguishing
between a "fiscal channel" and a "credit chan-
nel" of fund allocation. This has given rise to
the so-called "separation principle," which is
based on the idea that all the means ofproduc-
tion belong to the people, so that financial
surpluses arising from their labor should be
used for capital formation without interest and
repayment obligation. However, government
agencies, enterprises and households some-
times have idle funds on hand, while others
have temporary needs for funds. Banks must
attract these idle funds and redirect the funds
to those that have temporary need for them.
The theory asserts that, corresponding to the
two sources of funds: fiscal and banking, the
uses of these funds must also be separated.
Bank credit should be limited to temporary
financial needs, such as fluctuations in inven-
tories, agricultural credit between planting and
harvest, goods in transit, gaps between receipt
and payment, etc. Banks must charge interest
on the use ofsuch funds so that they can pay
the depositors. In contrast, funds needed for
fixed capital formation and working capital
(e.g., wages, investories) should be provided
through government budget appropriations
and disbursed through banks without interest
and repayment obligations. 13
The authorities claim that this separation
principle is not only compatible with a com-
munist philosophy of social organization, but
also constitutes prudent banking and a
safeguard against inflation. It is prudent bank-
ing, because it does not tie up "temporarily
idle funds" taken from depositors in "perma-
nent capital needs" of the fund-users. It
safeguards against inflation, because credits
are extended on the basis of idle funds
mobilized by banks, not through issuance of
currency. The validity ofthese arguments will
be discussed in the next section.According to officials interviewed in 1980,
the two channels offinancing differ in impor-
tance according to the type of economic
activity involved. On the whole, about 70 per-
cent of industry's capital needs are met
through fiscal appropriations, while 30 percent
are provided through bank credit - and con-
versely for commercial financing. Agricultural
financing is nearly all through bank credit,
except for relief and capital construction (e.g.
roads, irrigation facilities). For the nation as a
whole, fiscal funds financed 73 percent oftotal
capital formation, banking funds only 13 per-
cent, and other sources (mainly capital-de-
preciation allowances) another 14 percent.
A related, but somewhat different, principle
states that bank credit should be limited to
short-term financing of production and dis-
tribution of goods and services. Whereas the
separation principle emphasizes the distinction
between permanent and transitory needs of
capital, this bank-credit principle draws the
line between credit extension that enhances
current production and that which does not.
The distinction is important because, accord-
ing to this principle, credit extensions that
enhance current production and distribution
are necessarily non-inflationary, since any
consequent increase in currency circulation
would be matched by an equivalent expansion
of output. Moreover, upon the final sale of
goods and repayment ofcredit, areturn flow of
currencyis generated from consumers through
enterprises back to the banks. In contrast,
bank credits to finance government deficits,
consumer expenditures, stock speculation,
etc., do not add to the flow ofgoods and ser-
vices and hence are inherently inflationary.
This is, of course, the "real bills doctrine"
familiar to students ofmonetary economics of
an older generation in market economies. We
will consider its validity in aChinese context in
the next section.
(d) Interest rate policy. As stated, banks in
China pay interest on deposits and charge
interest on bank loans. According to People's
Bank data, interest rates were relatively low, in
view of the six percent annual inflation rate
in 1980: 2..88 percent a year on savings de-
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posits, 5.40 percent onone-year time deposits,
1.80 percent on enterprise deposits (transfer
balances), 5.04 percent on industrial and com-
mercialloans, and 4.32 percent on agricultural
loans.14
The authorities until recently have not used
interest rates as a conscious tool of credit
policy. Since 1953 they have raised commer-
cial and industrial loan rates only in 1959 and
1971. They changed the savings-deposit rate in
1959 and again in 1979 and 1980, raising the
rate in the latter two cases in an apparent
attempt to fight inflation by attracting a larger
volume ofsavings.
Role of Money
Monetary policy in China, as in the United
States, is concerned primarily with control
over the growth ofthe quantity ofmoney. Yet
paradoxically, what constitutes money is still
an unsettled question in both countries. In
China's case, some insight into that question
may be obtained by considering the payment
system in China - specifically, the difference
between the "transfer balance circuit" and the
"currency circuit." The former corresponds
broadly to the production sector, and the latter
to households and farm communes.
Government agencies and enterprises con-
stitute one economic decision-making unit,
with all production and distribution activities
guided by the nation's economic and financial
plans. Within that sphere, all entities must
keep "transfer balances" at designated banks
and make payments to one another only
through credits and debits to those balances.
These transfer balances, unlike our familiar
demand deposits, are not checkable in the nor-
mal sense; that is, depositors cannot draw
upon them for making payments to third par-
ties. Rather, each transfer is subject to explicit
approval by the bank holding the balance, to
ensure that the payment has received prior
authorization by the proper authorities (an
industrial bureau or a ministry), and that all
papers relating to the transaction are in order.
In a sense, these payment flows are not unlike
intra-company transfers within agiant corpora-
tion: in both cases, transfers are subject to the
case-by-case scrutiny by accounting personnel.In contrast to check payments in a market
economy, which represent an unconditional
transfer of funds, transfer balances in China
are good only for payments to government
entities and enterprise within the production
sector. Cash is required for payments to other
entities, such as households and farm com-
munes. In such cases, the payor would have to
apply to the relevant bank for approval in order
to convert transfer balances into currency.
The "currency circuit," on the other hand,
consists ofpayment flows between households
and farm communes on the one hand and
government agencies and enterprises on the
other. In addition, farm produce and han-
dicraft products can be sold on the "free
market" to consumers for cash. ("Free
market" prices are in fact subject to some offi-
cial supervision and control, though to a much
lesser degree than official market prices,)
Unlike transfer balances, currency is freely
transferable and can be used to purchase any-
thing on the market - subject only to the
availability of goods or services, and occa-
sionally to ration restrictions for certain
"essential goods" (e.g., rice, flour, cooking
oil, cloth).
There is little for money to buy except con-
sumergoods, and these have been in perennial
shortage. Since all means ofproduction belong
to the people, there are no common stocks or
land to buy. Until 1981, because of continual
government-budget surpluses, there were no
bonds or any other kinds of securities to
purchase. IS Houses and gold can be privately
owned, but can be sold only to the state;
foreign currencies cannot be held privately. In
short, money in China has far fewer uses than
it does in market economies. For households,
the only meaningful alternatives to holding
currency are bank savings and time deposits
and limited amounts ofconsumer goods.
Monetary Policy
There are no bank reserve requirements, no
security markets, and no discount windows in
China, so that all the traditional central-bank
policy instruments have no relevance in the
Chinese setting. Instead, monetary growth is
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regulated by explicit financial planning, i.e.,
through the Budget, the Credit Plan, and the
Cash Plan. However, the Cash Plan shows the
growth in currency circulation as the
difference between household wage incomes
and consumption minus increases in house-
hold time and saving deposits (see Appen-
dix) .16 Banks presumably could regulate de-
posits by adjusting deposit interest rates, but
they cannot regulate any of the other items in
the Cash Plan. Despite the considerable
amount ofmanpower devoted to the monitor-
ing ofcurrency flows - volume and composi-
tion by industry, by region, by season, etc. -
banks can do little to affect currency flows
directly.
But, of course, there is the Credit Plan.
Since currency growth is also equal to banks'
net lending (i.e., loans minus deposit
increases), in principle the currency-growth
rate could be determined by targeting a credit-
growth rate and a deposit-growth rate. In fact,
however, banks cannot always control their
own loan volume. In 1980, for instance, the
currency issue exceeded its target by 4.6 bil-
lion yuan, largely because ofa 4. I-billion yuan
central government budget overrun,17 which
the People's Bank was obligated to fund.
Clearly, monetary policy is not independent of
fiscal policy, in that the People's Bank must
accommodate any budget surplus or deficit
that should ari~e.
However, even a perfectly accommodative
policy does not necessarily imply that the
monetary authorities lack control over the
nation's money supply. In theory, they could
contract credits to enterprises sufficiently to
offset any amountoffiscal-deficit accommoda-
tion. But the actual practice in 1980 was quite
different. The banking system's credit to
enterprises in all sectors, including agriculture,
increased by 37.5 billion yuan, or 18 percent.
Although we have no information on whether,
and the extent to which, the increase exceeded
the planned amount, official data suggest that
these loans contributed at least as much to the
excess currency issue in 1980 as the banking
system's financing of government budget
deficit. 18 Clearly, credit policy was not con-ducted with a view towards offsetting the
impact of fiscal accommodation on the cur-
rency issue that year.
Little direct evidence is available ofthe po-
litical pressures on the banking system to
expand credit to local governments and
enterprises. Some inkling can be found,
however, in a major policy directive issued by
the State Council in February 1981: "No one
is allowed to force banks to make loans, refrain
banks and credit cooperatives from recalling
matured loans, declare forgiveness ofdebts, or
make unauthorized use ofcredit cooperatives'
funds." 19
II. Current Issues: The Quantity Equation and Money Management
China's modernization program seeks to
correct the errors of an excessively rigid
Soviet-type planned economy by providing
greater material incentives to workers and
more autonomy to enterprises (including farm
communes), and by substituting at least some
market forces for administrative decrees in the
economic decision-making process. Money
will inevitably play an expanding role in the
economy, butwhether money will be a bane or
a boon will depend crucially on how it is man-
aged. As the economic structure shifts away
from the Soviet model, the premises underly-
ing the nation's Soviet-style monetary
system20 shouldalso require re-examination.
Few observers expect a complete restructur-
ing of the nation's monetary and banking
system. A more realistic approach might be to
consider what adjustments in monetary and
credit policy could be made within the present
economic-planning framework, to strengthen
ways ofachieving macroeconomic stabilization
and of improving the efficiency of capital
allocation. This calls for a discussion of the
usefulness of the quantity equation as a guide
to monetary policy and the measurement of
money (discussed in this section), and of
China's credit-allocation policy (discussed in
the following section).
China's monetary authorities have followed
the Soviet model for a quarter-century in
explicitly planning for monetary growth -
foreshadowing the policy of money targeting
adopted by the major industrial countries just
within the past decade. What criteria do the
monetary authorities follow in setting money-
growth targets? The answer given in the
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Chinese economic Iiterature21 and in official
discussions is invariably: the quantity equa-
tion.
Quantity Equation
The quantity equation, MV=PQ, is a
familiar concept in the economic literature of
both socialist and market economies. It associ-
ates the price level (P) with the quantity of
money in circulation (M), the velocity of
money circulation (V), and the quantity of
goods being traded (Q). In Western economic
literature, the equation has been used in two
different ways for analyzing the effects of
money-supply changes on the national output
and the price level.
One approach, generally identified as the
"transactions approach" and attributed to Irv-
ing Fisher,22 analyzes the large number offac-
tors that influence P through the three "proxi-
mate causes": M, V, and Q. Popular thinking
generally has regarded V and even Q as con-
stants, so that P would change proportionately
with M, but the leading proponents of the
theory - such as Irving Fisher and Edwin W.
Kemmerer23 - explicitly rejected this
simplistic interpretation. They maintained that
the quantity equation states a condition for
market equilibrium, and that proportionality
between money and price changes holds only
in the long-run equilibrium. The central task
of monetary theory, in their view, consists of
analyzing the effects of a change in M on all
three factors (V, Q, and P) during what Fisher
called the "transition period."24 In the short
run, which is what counts most in monetary
analysis, the effects are anything but deter-
ministic and mechanical.Another approach, commonly identified as
the "asset approach" or the "Cambridge
approach,"25 also views the quantity equation
as a market-equilibrium condition - not for
the goods market, as in the Fisherian
approach, but for the money market. In other
words, it views PQN as the market demand
for money and M as the supply ofmoney, and
studies the adjustments in the public's spend-
ing behavior and asset portfolios following a
change in the underlying conditions. Thus, the
approach calls for an explicit specification of
the process of money creation, of the factors
determining money demand, and of the pro-
cess of adjustment towards money-market
equilibrium following, say, an increase in the
money supply.26 Again, in this approach,
neither V nor Q is considered as fixed in
analyzing the process of adjustment towards
market equilibrium.
In the Chinese economic Iiterature,27 the
quantity equation also serves as a starting point
ofmonetaryanalysis. But Chinese economists,
unlike Western economists, do not ask how P
and Q would be affected by a change in M.
Instead, they consider P as given by the
targeted price level and Q as given by the
planned volume of national output, and then
ask about the amount of money circulation,
M, that would be consistent with stated price
and output objectives, given the velocity ofcir-
culation, V. This line of thinking evidently
underlies the annual Cash Plan in the national-
planning process. Each year, bank officials at
local levels must compile a "Resident Cur-
rency Receipts and Expenditures Balance
Table," estimating the wage incomes, con-
sumption expenditures, savings and time de-
posits, cash on hand, etc., ofdifferent types of
residents, and this procedure helps determine
the velocity of circulation and the "required"
amount of currency for the residents of each
city and province. The People's Bank ofChina
aggregates these local financial data -
together with data for targeted output, wage
rates, and employment - and adjusts them for
"financial balance" to determine the planned
amountofgrowth in currency circulation.28
In a formal sense, the Chinese approach
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seems to resemble the Western monetary
approach, since both take off from the same
quantity equation of money. However, a com-
mon starting point means little, since the
quantity equation itself is no more than an
identity, and as an identity, it can be consistent
with widely divergent analytical approaches.
Again, both the Fisherian and the Cambridge
approaches use the quantity equation only as a
market-equilibrium condition; the analysis in
each case focuses on the market adjustment
after a change in the underlying conditions.
Moreover, in the adjustment process, neither
V nor Q is considered as fixed. In contrast, in
Chinese monetary analysis, adjustments
toward market equilibrium are precluded by
officially fixed prices and interest rates. With
P, Q, and V determined, the analysis never
really departs from the quantity equation as an
identity. The Chinese approach, unlike its
Western counterparts, thus sheds no light on
market behavior, and its analytical results can-
not be subject to empirical testing.
Nevertheless, Chinese monetary analysis
uses the quantity equation only for determin-
ing the optimal quantity ofmoney for achiev-
ing given price and output objectives. Hence,
the only relevant question is how useful the
equation is for accomplishing that limited pur-
pose.
To answer that question, let us consider a
hypothetical case - which is, incidentally, not
far removed from recent reality. Suppose that
prices and output are both fixed according to
plan, so that one side ofthe quantity equation,
PQ, is a constant. Now, the authorities raise
wage rates for a significant portion ofthe work
force and at the same time embark on an
ambitious investment program, financing both
through bank-credit extensions. As a result,
households hold more currencybutcan buy no
more consumer goods; similarly, enterprises
have larger transfer balances but can obtain no
more producer goods. Obviously, inflation
pressure has increased. But since prices are of-
ficially fixed, inflation is repressed, and there
are disequilibria in both the money and goods
markets.
Under such circumstances, does the quan-tity equation provide a reliable reflection ofthe
repressed inflation pressure? On the surface,
the answer might appear obvious. Since, by
assumption, PQ remains fixed, any increase in
M at given V must mean inflation pressure,
whether repressed or open.29 But the answer is
not quite so simple: It depends very much on
ho\v money is measured.
Measurement of Money
The official measurement ofmoney includes
only currency in circulation, for two reasons.
First, the authorities are concerned only with
the stability ofconsumer prices, which have to
do with people's livelihood, and not with pro-
ducer prices, which are merely accounting
devices for effecting transfers within the state
sector. Hence, they do not worry about
increases in transfer balances held by
enterprises, especially since enterprises must
obtain official approval for the use ofthese bal-
ances. Second, aside from questions of
availability of supplies, consumer inflation
pressure can arise only from increased cur-
rency holdings, because currency is the only
means of payment for the purchase of con-
sumer goods. As stated, enterprises cannot use
their transfer balances for purchasing con-
sumer goods, and households cannot have
checking accounts in banks. Hence, the mone-
tary authorities believe that they need only to
control the growth of currency circulation in
order to check inflation pressures.
This approach may be examined in terms of
the illustrative case presented above. Consider
first the consumer sector. As a result of the
postulated credit expansion, households
now hold more currency, but can buy no more
consumer goods, than before. Under the cir-
cumstances, households can either hold the
extra currency in the form of interest-earning
bank deposits, or hold part in deposits and part
in idle cash for consumer-goods purchases. In
the former case, all the extra cash flows back
into the banking system as increased time and
savings deposits, with no net increase in cur-
rency circulation and no change in velocity; in
the latter case, since PQ is a constant, V must
decline in proportion to the increase in M. In
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both cases, the authorities could mistakenly
conclude that a credit expansion has had no
impact on currency circulation, or that it has
produced an enhanced desire to hold currency
(i.e., a decline in velocity) exactly offsetting
any increase in currency circulation. Thus, the
quantity equation, combined with a narrow
-definition of money~ provides little indication
of the repressed-inflation pressure in the
system.
The failure of this approach can be partly
attributed to an inadequate measure ofmoney
and partly to a misinterpretation ofthe velocity
ofcirculation. The narrow definition ofmoney
makes a clear distinction between a) cash held
for transaction purposes and b) other types of
financial assets held in consideration of some
returns. The amount ofcash the public is will-
ing to hold depends in part on its alternative
cost in terms ofthe interest return foregone by
holding cash, and in part on the volume of
transactions the holding ofcash is intended to
facilitate. 3o This assumes that the public is free
to choose among consumer goods, cash and
other types of financial assets in holding its
wealth - which means that the definition
makes sense in a market economy. But in a
planned economy such as China's, with offi-
cially fixed prices and rampant shortages of
consumer goods, this narrow definition of
money could be seriously misleading. In our
illustrative case, a substantial portion of the
public's increased holdings of cash and time
and saving deposits might be involuntary,
because of a mismatch between enhanced
money income and limited consumer-goods
output. Increased money balances might
represent consumer frustration rather than
increased confidence in the value of the cur-
rency. Since bank deposits can be liquidated at
any time with no, or only minor, interest
penalties, depositors may regard their funds as
a temporary reservoir of purchasing power to
be used at any time goods become available.
Under these circumstances, the more
meaningful definition would include both cur-
rency and (at least) savings deposits.
However, this broader definition of money
still would not encompass a condition ofrepressed inflation. Because prices and output
presumably are both fixed according to plan,
the increase in money supply (by the broader
definition) would be offset by a proportionate
decline in the velocity of circulation. Here
also, the concept of velocity implies a public
demand for money, which is meaningful in a
market but not in a planned economy. In a
market economy, a decline in velocity means a
rise in the public's demand for money hold-
ings, say, on account oflower interest rates. It
implies a re-ordering of asset-holders'
portfolio choices among goods, cash and other
financial assets. In a planned economy, with its
widespread shortages, a decline in velocity (in
the absence of interest-rate changes), often
means simply an increase in consumer frustra-
tion.
This velocity phenomenon, combined with a
broadened definition of money, suggests a
potentially useful way of measuring repressed
inflation in an economy such as China's. In
our illustrative case, since there is no change
in prices, output, and interest rates, the entire
decline in velocity accompanying the money-
supply increase may be considered involun-
tary, resulting from insufficient supplies of
goods at prevailing prices. Then, the decline in
velocity multiplied by the increase in money
supply should measure the increase in
repressed inflation pressure. 31
This measure could be operationally useful
in policy-making. The authorities could select
abase year with few symptoms of repressed
inflation (e.g., ration coupons, queues in front
ofstores, bare store shelves). Subsequent de-
clines in velocity multiplied by current year
money supply (i.e., currency plus savings de-
posits) might indicate the amount ofrepressed
inflation occurring since the base year. Given a
policy ofmonetary restraint for reducing infla-
tion, the authorities mightattempt to achieve a
below-target rate of monetary growth until
velocity rises to its base year level - proper
adjustments being made to take account of
possible changes in velocity attributable to fac-
tors such as interest-rate changes and financial
innovations.
Finally, enterprises' transfer balances might
properly be included in an even broader
measure of the money supply.32 The reasons
cited above for their exclusion may have some
validity under a rigidly enforced planning
regime,33 but not in a regime where policy-
makers introduce more price adjustments into
both the producer and consumer sectors and
give more financial autonomy to enterprises.
In any case, a rise in transfer balances held by
enterprises might be as much a symptom of
repressed inflation as increases in savings de-
posits involuntarily held by households.
Moreover, as enterprises gain more autonomy
in the use oftheir bank accounts, the "money-
ness" of these balances will rise, increasing
the need to include them in the measurement
of the nation's money supply.
III. Current Issues: Credit Policy
As described earlier, China's bank-credit
policy theoretically is guided by two basic prin-
ciples: the "real bills doctrine" and the "sepa-
ration principle." In practice the doctrines
have not always been followed, and this con-
flict has given rise to considerable dispute in
Chinese economic literature on banking
policy,34 We shall consider these two doctrines
in turn in the context ofthe Chinese economy.
Real-Bills Doctrine
Chinese economists like to stress that the
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real-bills doctrine is a special feature of
socialist finance, in contrast to the bank
financing of non-productive, speculative
activities common in capitalist economies.35 In
their view, adherence to the doctrine accounts
for the Communistsuccess in stablizing prices,
while departures from it are a basic cause of
inflation.
Conceptually, however, the real-bills
doctrine is inconsistent with the quantity
theory of money. The latter holds that the
quantity ofmoney is a key determinant ofeco-nomic activities, especially the price level;
hence, the monetary authorities must actively
control the growth of·the money supply in
order to maintain price stability. But according
to the real-bills doctrine, so long as bank cred-
its finance •only current production and dis-
tribution of· goods.and services, there can
never be an over-issue or under-issue of
money. Therefore, an active monetary policy
that sets and adjusts the rate of money-supply
growth according to the quantity equation (or
any other approach) would be superfluous and
probably also destabilizing, as the money-
growth rate, however determined, would only
by chance be identical to the rate required by
the real needs of commerce.
The doctrine has had a long history in
Western economic thought, dating back at
least to Adam Smith in 1776. 36Itsuffices to say
that as early as 1802 Henry Thornton37 pointed
out that the doctrine is neither necessary nor
sufficient for insuring non-inflationary bank
finance. It is not necessary because, so long as
a credit expansion is offset by savings some-
where in the economy (e.g., fiscal surplus),
there is no inflation. Itis not sufficient because
a credit expansion, even though secured by
increased commodity output, gives rise to an
expansion in money income - which in turn
stimulates demand for more commodities,
thus justifying further bank credits to finance
production. Thus, a cumulative process could
be generated, leading to precisely the type of
boom-and-bust conditions the real-bills
doctrine is meant to avoid.
However, can this cumulative process occur
in a Communist system? Some say not. One
Western monetary economist wrote:
"We must not be too hasty to judge the
Communist credit policy on the basis of
modern Western monetary theory. In this
case, important differences in institutions
must be taken into account. .. The real bills
doctrine does not work in a capitalist econ-
omy mainly for two reasons. First,... the
increase in credit may bid up prices and bid
away resources from elsewhere. Sec-
ond,... the investment multiplier, or the
velocity of circulation of money, .,. could
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easily be larger than the gross productivity
ofthe working capital that actually get cre-
ated. Both these reasons, however, prob-
ably do not apply to a Socialist command
economy provided it is properly managed.
There, as the grant ofcredit is presumably
based.·uponthe planned availability of
materials and labor for the investment in
working capital at controlled prices, the first
reason obviously does not apply. Further-
more, the velocity of circulation of bank
balances of enterprises in a Communist
country is strictly under control, so that an
increase in credit would not necessarily
cause aggregate demand to outstrip sup-
ply."39
This analysis, however, pertains only to the
producer sector. In contrast, the cumulative
process following a credit expansion also raises
household money income, which then creates
additional demand for goods and services.
Even though material and labor prices can be
held fixed in a planned economy, each round
of credit expansion would still give rise to a
further rise in household money income and
hence to increased demand pressure on
resources. In the process, enterprises' transfer
balances will grow; controlling their use simply
means repressing inflation. Restrictive
measures, like price and wage controls in
market economies, only suppress the
symptoms of inflation, and do not abate its
latent pressures.
Thus, the real-bills doctrine does not appear
to be an effective anti-inflationary bank-credit
policy, even in a planned-economy context. By
adhering to it, the authorities may ignore the
need for controlling the money-growth rate or
the national savings-investment balance - the
essence of macroeconomic policy. Moreover,
the doctrine unnecessarily restricts banking
operations, and is in practice both preached
and breached. Banks in market economies
have long abandoned that principle and
engaged in all types offinancing, ranging from
consumer, equipment, real estate, to govern-
ment financing - without necessarily giving
rise to inflation. Banks in Chinahave also gone
beyond commercial-bill financing intomedium-term project financing. Banking
theory in this case thus lags behind and some-
times serves as a drag on banking practice.
"Separation Principle"
The "separation principle" is another car-
dinal rule of socialistic banking which China
adopted from the Soviet model in the 1950s.
As explained earlier, China makes a crucial
distinction between "fiscal funds" and "bank-
ing funds." Banks distribute fiscal funds to
enterprises, with no interest and repayment
obligations, for financing fixed-capital invest-
ments and regular ("quota") working-capital
needs. In contrast, they lend banking funds to
enterprises for meeting transitory, revolving
working-capital needs, with definite interest
and repayment obligations.
Banks are responsible for watching over the
two channels and guarding against the mixing
offunds in a manner that would sabotage the
separation principle. However, in practice,
since funds are notoriously fungible, the two
channels are constantly merging. The banks'
task is further complicated by the fact that fis-
cal funds are free, and therefore difficult to
obtain. Often, enterprises' capital-investment
projects are approved in the state economic
plan, but without sufficient appropriations.
Thus, to complete certain projects, enterprises
must obtain bank loans under the subterfuge
of "above quota" working-capital needs, and
surreptitiously employ the proceeds for fixed-
capital investments, wage and tax payments,
and other purposes for which banking funds
are ineligible. Banks are aware oftheir respon-
sibility to stop such practices, even though
they know that the enterprises are basically
sound and actually need the funds to carryon
business. Banks are thus caught in the unen-
viable position ofeither ignoring the problem
orconstantlyand fruitlessly complaining about
the condition.
As stated, the Chinese advocate the use of
this principle for two reasons: banking pru-
dence and non-inflationary credit extension.
The banking-prudence argument for the sepa-
ration principle can be dismissed quickly.
According to this argument, banks must meet
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deposit withdrawals, and prudence thus
requires that bank assets be limited to short-
term<and self-liquidating loans and invest-
Illents. The falsity of the argument has long
been demonstrated by banking experience all
oYer. the world.· To meet unexpected with-
drawals, only a small fraction ofa bank's total
assets needs to be held in liquid form. The
larger the bank's ready access to borrowing
facilities, the smaller needs to be the fraction.
For a banking system such as China's, with
onlyfour banks in the entire nation, all under
government control, deposit withdrawals
should be the least of problems.
The anti-inflation argument for the separa-
tion principle has more substance. According
to this argument, through national financial
planning the state allocates funds for invest-
ment, wage payments, etc., in a manner
designed for achieving macroeconomic bal-
ance. If enterprises are allowed to tap bank
credit for unplanned investment and other
types ofspending, this extra-plan spending will
lead to a breakdown of the macrobalance and
thus to inflation.39
The argument assumes, however, that
aggregate balance between savings and invest-
ment had already been attained in national
economic planning; then, additional credit
expansion for financing investment would
certainly be inflationary. But that is tautology.
It is an argument against excessive credit
expansion, when any credit expansion beyond
that set out in the Plan could be considered
"excessive." It is notan argument for the sep-
aration principle itself.
What is important for stabilization policy is
notso much the distinction betweensources of
funds as the total volume of investment rela-
tive to national savings. The separation princi-
ple, by providing free funds for more than 70
percent of enterprise investment funds
through· the fiscal channel, enlarges capital
delllandand encourages waste and inefficiency
in its use. Thus, the intended investment is
larger, and the resultant increase in output
smaller, when credit is allocated under the sep-
aration principle than it would otherwise be.
Within the existing socialist framework ofthe economy, there are various alternative
ways of allocating capital. One would be a
variation of the present practice: collect all
enterprise savings into the state treasury, de-
posit thefunds at banks, and let banks lend out
thefunds to enterprises. Another would befor
the .enterprises to decide how much of their
retained earnings to plough back into their
own projects and how much to channel
through the banks for investment elsewhere.
In the former case, a sufficiently high loan rate
would have to be charged to insure efficient
use of capital; in the latter case, a sufficiently
high deposit interest rate would have to be set
to attract funds away from self-financed invest-
ments and household consumption to invest-
ments with higher returns. Either approach
would mean the abandoning of the separation
principle and increased reliance on interest
rates for attracting savings and for capital
allocation.
Already, some movement away from the
separation principle towards greater reliance
on the market mechanism is discernible. In
August 1979, the State Council ordered the
Construction Bank to experiment with
medium- to long-term loans offive to fifteen
years· to enterprises on approved capital-con-
struction projects. The interest rate, however,
was set at only three percent a year, considera-
bly below the five-percent rate charged by the
People's Bank on short-term loans· to all
industrial and commercial borrowers. 4o In
addition, the People's Bank itselfhas started to
make short- to medium-term loans to textiles
and other light industries for renovating,
uPlrading, orenlarging existing facilities. 41
There was no follow-up, however, to these
tentative steps away from the strict Soviet
model ofcredit allocation. Indeed, as inflation-
ary pressures mounted during 1980, the
authorities fell back on the old, familiar bank-
ing principles to control inflation. In the
February 1981 State Council decision on
national credit policy, Article 2 declares:
"Restatement ofthe principle ofseparation
of fiscal capital and bank-credit capital; strict
prohibition ofany shifting ofbank-credit funds
for use on fiscal-type expenditures."42
IV. Summary and Conclusions
First, the Chinese economy today - includ-
ing its monetary and banking system - is a
socialist planned economy largely patterned
after the Soviet model. The "monobank" net-
work supplemented by a few special-purpose
banks, the Credit Plan and the Cash Plan, the
"transfer balance" and the currency circuits of
money circulation - all are Soviet inventions
of the early 1930s.
Second, money has a significantly lesser role
in this command economy than in a market
economy, especially since it provides little
purchasing power when goods are unavailable.
By the same token, monetary policy has a
much more restricted role in national
macroeconomic policy than it does elsewhere.
China's monetary policy has been cir-
cumscribed by: (a) the nearly complete
reliance on administrative controls for regulat-
ing monetary growth, and (b) the monetary
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authorities' lack of independence from both
central- and local-government authorities with
respect to credit allocation. Because of these
two factors, policy has necessarily been accom-
modative. The money-growth rate thus has
largely reflected fiscal policy, with monetary
stability resulting from a budget balance (or
surplus) and inflation resulting from a deficit.
Monetary policy in this context has been
incapable of making much difference to
stabilization efforts.
Third, effective monetary policy means
effective control over money-supply growth.
Monetary analysis in China has relied on the
quantity equation of money for determining
the targeted non-inflationary rate ofmonetary
growth. However, a mechanical reliance on the
equation - one assuming a given velocity of
circulation - appears inappropriate for a situa-
tion ofrigid prices and pronounced market dis-equilibria. Analternative approach - still rely-
ing on the quantity equation, but using
changes in velocity as a measure ofthe extent
of repressed inflation - could provide a
workable policy guide for China.
Fourth, we may question the rationale for
the official use of the narrow definition of
money supply, limited to currency circulation
only. In China's institutional environment,
the narrow definition could result in a serious
underestimate of latent inflationary pressures
in the .economy. Alternative measures to
remedy that underestimate might include
householdsavings and time deposits, as well as
"transfer balances" ofenterprises and govern-
ment agencies (excluding the state treasury).
Fifth, in the area of credit policy, official
thinking continues to be guided by the "real
bills doctrine" and the so-called "separation
principle," although banking practice has
begun to move away from these guidelines.
The theoretical support for these banking prin-
ciples, however, is found wanting even in the
Chinese cOl1text, so.that the tension between
official thinking·and•banking practice·is •.both
unnecessary and distractive from real issues of
economic stabilization and banking prudence.
These principles,moreover, require con-
tinued reliance on administrative controls for
enforcing compliance. Their replacement by a
flexible interest-rate policy would not only be
more in tune with the spirit ofModernization,
but also would help support the development
of an effective monetary policy, operating
through market forces rather than quantitative
controls.
Appendix: A National-Accounts Model of China's Financial
Plan
This appendix presents a scQ.ematic frame-
work ofthe structure ofChina'sFinancial Plan
in terms ofsectoral accounts and inter-sectoral
financial flows. As explained in the text, the
Financial Plan consists of (a) the Government
Budget, (b) the Credit Plan, and (c) the Cash
Plan. The three parts are interrelated such
that, given any two, the third is determined.
From the point ofview ofmonetary policy, the
CashPlan is ofprimary importance, as it deter-
mines the money-growth rate. Itis constructed
on the basis ofdata on household income and
expenditure, and it must also be consistent
with planned financial flows of the Govern-
mentand Banking sectors. That is why China's
financial planners place so much emphasis on
reconciliation of the various parts of the plan.
And that is why monetary policy, as presently
constituted, is largely determined by decisions
made outside the central bank's jurisdiction.
The national economy may be divided into
four sectors, and the sectoral financial transac-
tions during the plan period may be sum-
marized as follows:
Sector Sources of Fund Uses of Fund












C H + CG+ IG+ BE
D G+ DE + SH+ CD
WG+WE
designates taxes and profits
paid into the state treasury;
borrowings from banks;
output of, or expenditure on,







wages and salaries, bonuses,
payments in kind, and govern-
ment subsidies to workers
(e.g., housing, health care);I, investments in plant, equip-
ment, inventories, and land
improvement;
D, increase in transaction balances
in banks;
S, increase in bank savings and
tirnedeposits;
CU, increase in currency circula-
tion.
Allitemsare statedin nominal values, andthe
subscriptsG,E,H designate the Government,
Enterprise, and Households sectors respec-
tively.
Equation (0 shows the Government
Budget. BG and DGare financing items, reflect-
ing the government's position vis-a-vis the
banking system. A positive BG indicates net
government borrowing, and a negative BG net
government repayment of bank debt. A posi-
tive DG indicates a net increase in government
deposit balances at banks, and a negative DG a
netdec:rease in such balances. IG is enterprise
capital formation financed by the government,
which also appears as a source offunds for the
Enterpr!sessector in equation (2).
Equation (2) shows the sources and uses of
fundsQf the Enterprises sector vis-a-vis the
other s.ectors on a consolidated basis. Both
sides ofthe equation are equal to the sectoral
net output.The left-hand side ofthe equation
shows that the net output consists of sales to
the Households sector (C H) and to the
Government sector (C G) , "fixed-capital
investment plus quota inventory accumula-
tion" financed by the government (IJ, and
"above-quota inventory accumulation"
financed by bank credit (BrJ .
Equations (3) and (4) are straightforward
sQurce-lmd.use-of-fund equations for the
Banking and Households sectors, respectively.
The rnodel abstracts from the real world in
order to show the essence ofChina's financial
planning. Omitted are foreign.trade flows,
changes in foreign assets, retained earnings,
and capital-depreciation allowances. These
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could be added at will, without changing the
essence of the analysis.
The model contains all three compQnent~of
the Financial Plan. The Government Budget,
as stated, is equation .(1). The Credit Plan is
sh~wn in equation (3). The Cash Plan can be
derived from equation (4). by showing. an
increase in currency circulation (CU) as the
difference between Households' incomes (Wo
+ WrJ onthe one hand and Households'cQn-
sumption .plus increase in Househ.olds' time
and savings deposits (C H +. S~ on the other
hand. In reality, of course, agricultural com-
munes are included in the Households sector
insofar as the Cash Plan is concerned.
From equations (0 and (3), it can be shown
that
(CU + S~ = (BE-DP) + (BG-DG ). (5)
In other words, an increase in the sum ofcur-
rency circulation and household time and sav-
ings deposits must arise from banks' net lend-
ings to enterprises and the government. Since
banks' net lending to the government is the
mirror-image of the deficit (or surplus) of the
Government Budget, since banks' lending to
enterprises embodies the net outcome of the
Credit Plan, and since the growth in currency
and household time and savings deposits
reflects the outcome of the Cash Plan, equa-
tion (5) summarizes the interrelationship
among all three components of the Financial
Plan.
Moreover, equation (5) provides flexibility
in the choice of measurement of money. As
discussed in the text, the official measurement
includes only currency circulation. One can
show the sources ofits increase by moving SH
to the right-hand side of equation (5). Alter-
natively, if one wishes to include household
time and savings deposits, SH should remain
on the left-hand side ofequation (5). An even
broader definition ofmoney would include the
"transfer balances", in which case DE would
be moved to the left-hand side ofequation (5).FOOTNOTES
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